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Abstract 
We consider the assignment of heterogeneous and indivisible objects to agents without 
using monetary transfers, where each agent may be assigned more than one object, and 
the valuation of the objects to an agent may depend on what other objects the agent is 
assigned. The set of strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal social choice functions 
is characterized as dictatorial sequential choice functions. Thus, the consequences of 
a Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type result can only be escaped in this context by using bossy 
social choice functions. It is also established that all strategyproof, strongly nonbossy and 
Pareto-optimal social choice functions are serial dictatorships, where strong nonbossiness 
is a stricter version of bossiness. 
Strategyproof and Nonbossy Assignments 
Szilvia Papai* 
1 Introduction 
We consider the assignment of heterogeneous and indivisible objects to agents who have 
private information about their preferences. The objects are heterogeneous in the sense 
that they typically have different values to the agents. The agents may obtain any set 
of objects. Thus, our model is an extension of the much studied assignment model, 
where the agents can get at most one object. A most important characteristic of our 
model is that the objects may increase or decrease each other's values when obtained 
together. That is , the value of an object to an agent may not be independent of the 
other objects assigned to her. In addition, the agents cannot be charged for the objects, 
that is , monetary transfers are not allowed. 
We require the allocation rules to be compatible with individual incentives. Thus, 
given that the agents have private information, the planner faces an implementation prob­
lem, a problem of designing an allocation mechanism that induces appropriate incentives 
for the agents. We examine allocation rules, called social choice functions, for which this 
implementation problem is solvable, using the dominant strategy solution concept .  This 
solution concept requires the implementing mechanism to provide a best action (strat­
egy) for each agent, regardless of the other agents' actions. In other words, the examined 
social choice functions are strategyproof. 
When strategyproofness is required, attention is restricted to direct mechanisms, 
mechanisms that ask the agents to report their own preferences, due to the well-known 
revelation principle. Therefore, a direct mechanism that implements a social choice func­
tion will mirror the social choice function, in the sense that the outcome of the mechanism 
will coincide with the outcome prescribed by the social choice function for each preference 
profile. Thus, the criteria applied to the mechanisms apply to the social choice functions 
as well. 
Dominant strategy equilibria are desirable, because they eliminate any strategic in­
teraction among the agents. Admittedly, the existence of dominant strategy equilibria is 
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a very strong requirement . Other common solution concepts, such as Nash-equilibrium 
and Bayesian-Nash-equilibrium are less demanding. The Nash-equilibrium concept, how­
ever, requires the agents to have full information about each other's preferences, while 
dominant strategy equilibria do not require any such information. The Bayesian-Nash 
solution concept, which also tends to produce better results, is based only on the knowl­
edge of the agents' prior distributions. Nonetheless, the exact knowledge of these prior 
distributions is typically crucial to these results. Since dominant strategy mechanisms 
are robust in the sense that they do not use the information structure in the economy, it 
is essential to explore strategyproof mechanisms. 
We also require social choice functions to be efficient. It is easy to see that a social 
choice function that prescribes the maximization of the sum of the utilities for agents is 
not strategyproof since only preference orderings can be elicited if strategyproofness is 
required.1Therefore, we use Pareto-optimality as a criterion of efficiency. 
Another requirement we impose on social choice functions is nonbossiness. This cri­
terion was introduced by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981 ), and used subsequently 
by Ritz (1983) , Olson (1991) , and Barbera and Jackson (1995) , among others. A social 
choice function is bossy if there exists at least one agent whose preferences can change 
in a way that the prescribed allocation is different for some other agent(s) , but not for 
herself, while everyone else's preferences are unchanged. Intuitively, this is an undesirable 
property, given that the mechanism mirrors the social choice function that it implements. 
This means that the agent who can change some other agent's allocation without chang­
ing her own may use her "power" by accepting a bribe or blackmailing. Admittedly, 
nonbossiness and strategyproofness together amount to more than individual incentive 
compatibility. Indeed, Barbera and Jackson (1995, Lemma 4) showed that these two 
conditions together imply a weak form of coalitional strategyproofness. However, while 
coalitional strategyproofness may be too restrictive for voting problems, it is also true 
that bossy behavior does not typically arise in these contexts. In fact, when indifferences 
·are not admissable, bossiness obviously cannot occur, and ruling out indifferences might
be quite agreeable in voting contexts. In contrast, when private goods are being allocated
to selfish agents, indifferences cannot be ruled out.
The dominant strategy solution concept is indeed very demanding, which is illus­
trated by the famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. It states that in the context of 
voting the only social choice functions which induce truthful reporting of the preferences 
designate some favored voter who dictates the outcome. Underlying this impossibility 
theorem is the assumption that all conceivable preferences of the agents are admissable. 
We need to remark, however, that a similar impossibility result has been established for 
various restricted preference domains. For example, Barbera and Peleg (1990) proved this 
negative result for continuous preferences, and Zhou (199la) for continuous and convex 
preferences. 2 When the allocation of private goods is considered, the outcomes have as 
many components as agents, each component representing the allotted bundle of private 
1 See, for example, Le Breton and Sen (1995) or Olson (1991). 
2See also Sprumont (1995) that surveys some of the relevant literature. 
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goods for some agent. If we assume that the agents are selfish, i.e., that they only care 
about their own bundle of goods, then not all conceivable preferences are admissable. In 
particular, preferences other than indifference are ruled out between any two outcomes 
for any agent when the agent's component is the same in the two outcomes. Since the in­
divisible objects are heterogeneous and their valuations are interdependent, any valuation 
of the sets of objects are conceivable, so that further assumptions beyond selfishness need 
not be imposed on the preferences. We do assume, however, for simplicity's sake, that 
the agents cannot be indifferent between any two sets of objects, and between obtaining 
and not obtaining a set of objects. That is, indifference is ruled out for each agent be­
tween any two assignments where the agent's components in the two assignments are not 
identical. Since this domain does not contain either the universal domain investigated 
by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) or the restricted (public) domains for which 
a Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type result was proved, an obvious question to ask is whether 
a Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type impossibility result would be obtained for it. Studies that 
examine strategyproofness in the context of allocating private goods focus on divisible 
goods, so that a further a priori structure (e.g., continuity, convexity, nonsatiation, etc. ) 
is imposed on the preferences (see, for example, Zhou (199lb) and Barbera and Jackson 
(1995)). Thus, the results in these papers don't apply to our problem either. 
A closely related result was produced by a line of research in social choice theory that 
investigated the existence of Arrow social welfare functions on the so called private al­
ternatives domains, starting with Kalai and Ritz (1980). The largest private alternatives 
domain that they considered is identical to our domain of preferences. Continuing this 
research, Ritz (1983) established a a reciprocity result for private alternatives domains be­
tween Arrow-type social welfare functions and Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type social choice 
functions (in fact, he allows for social choice correspondences) .  Given Example 1 in Kalai 
and Ritz (1980), Theorem 3 of Ritz (1983) implies that the domain we investigate does 
not admit any rational, strategyproof, nonbossy, and nondictatorial social choice corre­
spondence. It is important to point out that rationality is not a reasonable requirement 
in the context of private goods allocation problems, as it requires that for every set of out­
comes the social choice function has to select the best element of an Arrow social welfare 
function. In voting or public goods contexts it is a reasonable criterion if we wish to take 
into account that some outcomes (alternatives) may not be feasible. In the context of 
private goods allocation problems, however, an outcome not being "feasible" in this sense 
means that some particular distribution of the fixed amounts of private goods is not feasi­
ble, which does not make much sense. When private goods are being allocated, feasibility 
problems are related to the amount of the private goods available for distribution:. If the 
amount of the private goods is reduced then the outcome space "shrinks" accordingly. 
However, any particular distribution of the available amount of private goods should be 
treated as feasible, unless the focus is on some special circumstances that restrict the 
agents a priori to obtain at most a certain amount of the goods. 
Returning to the question on a Gibbard-Satterthwaite-type impossibility in our con­
text, the answer turns out to be positive. However, the consequences of such an impos­
sibility result can only be escaped in our model by using bossy social choice functions. 
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That is, any strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal social choice function is dicta­
torial for the multi-object assignment problem. We need to point out that dictatorship 
is defined in a weaker sense here than is usual in voting contexts. Our dictator is not a 
dictator in the strong sense that, given any profile of the other agents, the dictator can 
"determine" the outcome, i.e., the allocations to the other agents as well.3 This defini­
tion is more apropriate in the context of private goods allocation problems because the 
nonexistence of the conventional dictatorship is a very weak requirement. It would be 
ruled out by Pareto-optimality (or nonbossiness) alone.4 This weaker definition, however, 
is in the spirit of the original definition of dictatorship (see Gibbard (1973), for example), 
in that a dictator can get her first choice regardless of the others' will. Thus, given the 
feasibility constraints, our dictator affects the outcomes of the other agents, which makes 
the distribution of power lopsided. However, since the dictator may be indifferent among 
outcomes that give her top choice to her, a dictatorial mechanism, as defined in this 
study, may take into account other agents' preferences as well. 
Given that dictatorship is defined here in a weak sense, it follows that not all dictato­
rial mechanisms are strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal, unlike on the universal 
domain. Since in our context indifferences cannot be ruled out entirely, if the dictator is 
indifferent among outcomes that give her top allocation to her, which implies that some 
objects are available for allocation among the rest of the agents, then there is still room 
for manipulation and bossiness, and it is possible to get a Pareto-dominated outcome. 
Therefore, we need to characterize the set of strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal 
social choice functions. We prove that a social choice function is strategyproof, non bossy, 
and Pareto-optimal if, and only if, it is a dictatorial sequential choice function. A dicta­
torial sequential choice function is one in which for each profile there exists an ordering 
of the agents such that the first agent in the ordering gets her favorite allocation, then, 
from the remaining objects, the second agent in the ordering gets her favorite allocation, 
etc., until we run out of either the objects or the agents. However, the ordering of the 
agents at the different profiles is not arbitrary. For each profile, the first agent in the 
ordering must be the same, hence these social choice functions are dictatorial. Moreover, 
the ordering of the rest of the agents may only vary at the different profiles as a function 
of the allocations of the preceeding agents. 
If the ordering of the agents is fixed a priori, that is, if it is independent of the prefer-
3This is not to be confused with the distinction between weak and strong dictatorship in Muller and 
Satterthwaite (1986), which has to do with the feasible sets of alternatives, i.e., whether the agent is a 
dictator over a single feasible set or every feasible set. Satterthwaite (1975) distinguishes between fully 
and partially dictatorial voting procedures, which depends on whether it is in the dictator's power to 
impose any outcome or whether she is constrained to some subset of the possible outcomes. This is also 
different from the distinction discussed here. 
4Zhou (1991b) proves for the two-agent case, where private goods are divisible and the admissable 
utility functions are continuous, strictly quasi-concave, and increasing, that any Pareto-optimal and 
strategyproof mechanism is inversely dictatorial. A mechanism is inversely dictatorial if one agent gets 
0 at each profile. This is also a very weak requirement in our context, since the agents may have a 
negative evaluation for any set of objects, and thus Pareto-optimality alone ensures that an SCF is not 
inversely dictatorial. 
4 
ence profile, we get a serial dictatorship. Serial dictatorships were investigated for private 
goods economies by Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) .  In particular, they charac­
terized the set of serial dictatorships in the context of allocating divisible private goods. 
Although they did not impose further restrictions on the domain beyond selfishness and 
a condition, called broad applicability, which requires that the set of admissible utility 
functions is open, a condition that amounts to certain "richness" of the domain, they 
required several differentiability conditions to ensure that the mechanism is "smooth. '' 
Clearly, their result does not apply to our model with indivisible goods. A further ques­
tion is then, whether we need to impose much stricter criteria than strategyproofness, 
nonbossiness, and Pareto-optimality to get serial dictatorships. Interestingly, only non­
bossiness needs to be strengthened to limit our choice exclusively to serial dictatorships. 
We call the more stringent criterion that replaces bossiness in this characterization result 
strong nonbossiness. It requires that the agents should only be able to affect each other's 
allocations through the feasibility constraints. It is, thus, essentially a negative result 
if we consider that strong nonbossiness is not an extreme requirement. Compared to 
Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein's chracterization, it seems like a somewhat surprising 
result as well. While strong nonbossiness rules out some of the above described "affect" 
relationships, one of Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein's criterion, called everywhere to­
tal, requires that each agent can affect any other ag�nt at any profile. This apparent 
contradiction will be discussed in more detail later. 
As a final remark before the formal presentation of the results, let us emphasize the 
importance of the feasibility constraints. If the same set of allocations were available to 
each agent, regardless of what the others get, there would be no conflict to solve. As 
opposed to voting, or a public goods economy, in this case each agent would get her 
favorite allocation. That is, for private goods allocation problems, the conflict stems 
from the fact that the amount of private goods available for allocation is fixed, i .e . , from 
the scarcity of the resources expressed in the feasibility constraints. 
2 Notation, Definitions, and Some Initial Results 
There are n 2: 2 agents and k 2: 2 objects to be allocated among the agents. Let N 
denote the set of n agents and K the set of k objects. Let /( denote the union of the 
power set of K and the set consisting of a null object, {O}, which is an artificial "object" 
used for notational convenience. We will say that if an agent is not assigned any object, 
it is assigned a null object. 
An outcome x is an n x (2k - 1) matrix, in which each element x� is defined by 
x
i = { 1 if a is assigned to agent i a 0 otherwise, 
Vi E N, Va E /(. To make the notation simple, we will write that xi = a when x� = 1 
and xt = 0, Vb E /(, b =J a. If agent i is not assigned any set of objects as part of outcome 
x, then xi = 0. We will refer to xi as agent i's allocation in outcome x. 
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An outcome x is feasible if none of the objects is assigned more than once, i. e., 
niEN xi = 0 or {O} . Denote the set of feasible outcomes by x. 
Let e� denote the value that agent i places on the set of objects denoted by a. Then 
ei = (BL . . .  , e�k_1) is a list of the values placed by agent i on the set of sets of objects, 
which we will refer to as preferences. The value of the null object is zero to each agent i 
with any preferences ()i .  We assume that each agent i is selfish, that is, that each agent 
i only cares about the ith element of x, which implies that she is indifferent between 
any two outcomes in which she gets the same allocation. For notational convenience, we 
define a utility function for each agent i by U(xi , fJi )  = 'l:aEICx�O� ,'v'x E X,'v'i E N. We 
also assume that each agent has strict preferences over her allocations. That is, 'y'()i E ei , 
e� =f. et whenever a =f. b, 'v'a, b E IC. Let Gi be the set of admissable preferences for agent 
i ,  so that ()i E ei , 'v'i E N. The set of admissable preferences for all agents is denoted by 
e = xiENei . Let e E e  denote a profile of the agents. Similarly, let e-i be the profile of 
all the agents except for agent i. 
Definition 1 A social choice function is a function f : 8 H X. 
Definition 2 A mechanism (g , S) is a set of strategy spaces Si, 'v'i E N, where S = xiENSi, and a function g: SH X. 
Definition 3 A direct mechanism g is a mechanism for which agent i's strategy space 
is Si= ei, 'v'i E N, so that S = 8. 
Let· fi(O) denote the allocation prescribed to agent i by f at 0, and let gi(O) denote 
i 's allocation resulting from mechanism g ,  when the reported profile is e .  
Definition 4 An SCF f i s  strategyproof if 'v'O E 8, 'v'i E N, 'v'Oi E ei , U(Ji(O) , fJi) � 
U(Ji(Oi , e-i) , Oi) .  If f is not strategyproof then it is manipulable. Then e E e, i E N  
and §i E ei such that U(Ji(O) , Bi) < U(Ji(§i , e-i ) ,  fJi) . We then say that agent i can 
manipulate at e via §i. 
Definition 5 An SCF f is nonbossy if'v'O E e, 'v'i, j E N, 'v'Oi E ei , if fi(O) = Ji(§i , e-i 
, then f i ( 0) = Ji ( §i , e-i . If f is not non bossy then it is bossy. Then 30 E 8, i, j E N 
and §i E ei such that fi(O) = Ji(§i , e-i , and Ji(fJ) =f. Ji(Oi , e-i . We then say that i is 
bossy at e versus (Bi , e-i) . 
· 
Definition 6 An SCF f is Pareto-optimal if 'v'O E 8, there does not exist y E X such 
that 'v'i E N, U(yi , Oi) � U(Ji(O) , Oi ) ,  and, for some j E N, U(yi , fJi) > U(ji(O) , Oi ) .  
Let top(Oi) denote the top-ranked set of objects according to  fJi . That is, 'v'i E N, 'y'()i E 
Gi, 'v'a E IC, U(top(Oi) ,  Oi) � U(a, fJi) . 
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Definition 7 An SCF f is nondictatorial if there does not exist i E N such that 
VB E 8, Ji(B) = top(Bi) . If f is not nondictatorial then it is dictatorial. Then ::Ji E N 
such that VB E 8, Ji(B) = top( Bi) . We then say that i is a dictator for f. 
A useful result is that strategyproofness and nonbossiness together imply monotonic­
ity. 
Definition 8 An SCF j satisfies monotonicity if VB, B E 8 such that J(B) x, if 
Vy E X, Vi E N, U(xi, Bi) 2: U(yi, Bi) =? U(xi, §i) 2: U(yi, §i) then j(B) = x. 
Lemma 1 5 A strategyproof and nonbossy SCF is monotonic. 
Proof: Suppose f is strategyproof, non.bossy, and :38, B E 8 such that J(B) = x and 
Vy E X, Vi E N, U(xi, ei);::: U(yi, Bi) =} U(xi}i);::: U(yi, §i) . Let J(B1 , e-1) = z. 
Then either z = x or z1 =/= x1 , by f 's nonbossiness. If z1 =/= x1 then strategyproofness 
implies that U(x1 , B1 )  > U(z1 , B1 ) .  Then by assumption, U(x1 , B1 )  > U(z1 , B1), given 
that z1 =/= x1 . However, this contradicts f 's strategyproofness. Therefore, z = x, and 
f(iJ1, e-1 )  = x. Repeating the same argument for i = 2, . . . , n, we get that J(iJ) = x, as 
required. D 
Remark that strategyproofness alone is equivalent to the IPM property, as was shown 
by Dasgupta et al. (1978) .6 However, it is not equivalent to strong positive association, 
(SPA) on our domain, in contrast with the domain that consists of all strict preferences, 
for which the equivalence was shown by Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) . In fact, SPA is 
equivalent to monotonicity so that SPA implies strategyproofness, but strategyproofness 
alone does not imply SPA on our domain. Thus, Lemma 1 underlines that on the 
examined domain strategyproofness and nonbossines together rule out the same sources 
of strategic behavior as strategyproofness alone on the usual (public) domains. 
Pareto-optimality and bossiness are incompatible when there are only two agents, 
which is demonstrated below. Accordingly, the results that require Pareto-optimality 
in the following sections can be restated without the non.bossiness assumption for the 
two-agent case. 
Lemma 2 I f  there are only two agents then a Pareto-optimal SCF is nonbossy. 
I 
Proof: Let n = 2 and let f be Pareto-optimal and bossy. Suppose agent 1 is bossy. Then 
:JO E 8 and iJ1 E 81 such that f1(81, B2) = j1(B1, 02) and j2(01, 02) =/= j2(iJ1, 02). Let 
f(B1, 02) = x and f(B1, 02) = y ,  so that x1 = y1 and x2 =!= y2 • Then either U(x2, 02) > 
U(y2, 02) or U(x2, 02) < U(y2, 02), and x1 n x2 = 0, x1 n y2 = 0, by feasibility. This 
implies that either y or x is not Pareto-optimal.D 
5Essentially the same result is shown in Olson (1991, Lemma 8.11) and Barbera and Jackson (1995, 
Lemma 2), although both in a somewhat different setting, and using completely different terminology. 
The proof is given here for self-containment. 
6For the correct version of IPM, see, for example, Laffont and Maskin (1982). 
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3 Characterization of Strategyproof, Nonbossy, and 
Pareto-optimal Social Choice Functions 
First we prove that any strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal SCF is dictatorial. 
Proposition 1 A strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal SCF is dictatorial. 
To prove this result we need to introduce some more definitions and provide two 
lemmas. Both lemmas and the definitions to follow are based on Barbera (1983), who 
proved the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem using the concept of pivotal voters. 
A reshuffiing of a preference ordering around an outcome x is another preference or­
dering under which x preserves the same relative position to all the other outcomes. For­
mally, for Bi E ei and x E X, Bi E ei is a reshuffling of Bi around x if Vy E x, U(x, Bi)� 
U(y, Bi) {:::} U(x, Bi) � U(y, Bi) .  Let r(x, Bi) denote the set of reshufflings of Bi around 
x .  Clearly, no agent can change the outcome of a strategyproof and nonbossy SCF f at 
any profile by changing her reported preferences to a reshuffling around that outcome. 
This follows immediately from monotonicity, or can be verified directly by checking that if 
f(B) # !(Bi , B-i) for some agent i, profile B, and Bi E r(f(B) , Bi) then, since f is nonbossy, 
agent i can manipulate f either at B via Bi' or at (Bi' B-i) via Bi. 
Let (Bi)x denote the preferences obtained from Bi when x is ranked first, preserving 
the ordering of all the other outcomes in Bi. Similarly, let ( Bi)x denote the preference ordering when x is ranked last, (Bi)x,y when x is ranked first and y is ranked second, and 
(Bi)� when x is ranked first and y is ranked last. 
For Y � X, i E N, and Bi E ei , let c(Y, Bi)= {x E Y I  Vy E Y, U(x, Bi) � U(y, Bi)} be 
the set of the best outcomes in Y for agent i with preferences Bi . For Y � X, i E N, and 
. Bi E ei , let ci(Y, Bi) = xi such that U(xi, Bi) � U(yi , Bi) ,  Vy E Y, where x E Y. Given 
that only strict preferences over allocations are admissable, ci(Y, Bi) is a singleton for 
each agent i and Bi . Since it will be clear in the following which SCF we refer to, c(Y, Bi) 
and ci(Y, Bi) are not indexed for f ,  just as in other definitions to follow. Let o(j, B-j) 
denote agent j 's option set for B-j, i . .  e. , the set of outcomes that can be achieved by j 
where the rest of the agents report B-j. 
The lemma to follow states that no agent can change the option set of any other agent 
at any profile, by changing her preferences to a reshuffling around the outcome· of f at 
that profile, provided f is strategyproof and nonbossy. 
Lemma 3 If an SCF f is strategyproof and nonbossy, then VB E 8, Vi, j E N, VBi E 
r(f(B) , Bi) , o(j, B-j) = o(j, (Bi , B-i,j)) . 
Proof: Let f be strategyproof and nonbossy. Let BE 8, i,j E N, and Bi E r(f(B) , Bi) .  We 
will show that o(j, (Bi , B-i,j) ) � o(j, B-j). Since f(Bi , B-i) = f(B) , and Bi E r(f(B) , Bi) ,  a 
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similar argument will prove that a(j, e-j) � o(J, (Bi , e-i,j) ) ,  which establishes the desired 
result. 
Suppose o(j, (Bi , e-i,j) ) � o(j, e-j) . Then :3y E X  such that y E o(j, (Bi , ()-i ,j)) and 
y </. o(j, e-j). Let j(B) = f(Oi , e-i) = x. Then x =I y, since x E o(j, e-j) . Since x = 
c(o(j, e-j) , Bj) and y <f_ o(j, e-j) , we have x = c(o(j, e-j) , (Bj) y ) = f((Bj)Y, e-j) . However, 
y E o(j, (Bi , e-i,j)) implies that c(o(j, (e-i , e-i,j) , (Bj)Y) = y, so f(Oi , (Bj)Y, e-i,j) = y. In 
sum, we have f(Bi , (Bj)Y, e-i,j) = x, and f(Oi , (Bj)Y, e-i,j) = y. If xi# yi , then ()i E r(x, Bi) 
implies that agent i can manipulate either at (Bi , (Bj)Y, e-i ,j) via §i or at f(Oi , (Bj)Y, e-i,j) 
via ()i. This contradicts f's strategyproofness, hence xi = yi . However, in this case 
nonbossiness implies that x = y, which is a contradiction. D  
The next lemma is about the agents' ability to affect each other's allocation. An agent 
affects another agent at a given profile if she can change the other agent's allocation by 
deviating her messages. 
Definition 9 For an SCF f, agent i affects agent j at (} E 8, if :3Bi E Gi such that 
fj(B) =I fj(Bi , e-i). We then write that iA(B)j. 
The following lemma states that if two agents can affect one another at some profile, 
then at least one of them is able to "get" the allocation the other one "imposes" on her, 
by deviating her message at that profile, or the "imposed" allocation is the null object 
for at least one of them, given a strategyproof and nonbossy SCF. 
Lemma 4 If an SCF f is strategyproof and nonbossy then 'if(} E 8, 'i/i, j E N, i # j, 
such that iA(B)j and jA(B)i, and 'i/Oi E ei, 'i/Bj E ej such that ji(Bi , e-i) =I fj(B) and 
Ji(ej, e-j) =I Ji(B), we have one of four cases: (a) Ji(Bi , e-i) = Jj(Bj, e-j) , (b)Ji(ej, e-j) = 
Ji(ei , e-i ) ,  (c)Ji(Bi , e-i) = o, or (d) Ji(ej, e-j) = o. 
Proof: Let f be strategyproof and non bossy. Let (} E 8, i, j E N, i # j, such that 
iA(B)j and jA(B)i. Fix Bi E ei such that ji(Oi , e-i) # ji(B) , and fix Bj E ej such that 
Ji(Bj, e-j) =I Ji(B). Let f(B) = x, f(Oi , e-i) = y, and f(Bj, e-j) = z. Then x, y E o(i, e-i ) ,  
x, z, E o(j, e-j) , zi =I xi, and yj =I xj. Suppose yj  =I zj, yi =I zi , yj  =I 0, and zi =I 0. Since 
zi =I 0, it is possible that U(xi , ()i) < U(zi , ()i ) ,  and, similarly, since yj =I 0 it is possible 
that U(xj, Bj) < U(yj, Bj) . Then we can define (Ji , ej, Bi , and Bj as follows. Let . 
gi = { (B�) zi if U(xi' ()i) > U(zi ' ()i) (eiy• if U(xi ' ()i )  < U(zi ' ()i ) ,  
ej = { ( e�) y i if U(xj, Bi) > U(yj, Bj) ( (}J ) YJ if U ( xj , (}j) < U ( yj , (}j) , 
{ / if U(xi' ()i) > U(zi ' ()i )  ei = ( e i  zi . (eiy'.y ' if U(xi , ()i )  < U(zi , ()i ) ,  
g 
and 
(Bi) ;� . if U(xi, Bi) > U(yi, Bi) (Bi) yJ,zJ if U(xi, Bi) < U(yi, Bi) . 
Note that Bi E r(xi , ei) , Oi E r(xi, Oi) , {Ji E r(zi , Oi ) ,  and {Ji E r(yi, Oi) . 
Since Bi E r(xi, Bi) , o(i , (Bi, e-i,i) ) = o(i, e-i ) ,  by Lemma 3. Then y E o(i, (Bi, e-i ,i)) ,  
so c(o(i, (Bi, e-i,j) , Bi) = y if U(xi , Bi) > U(zi , ei) .  If U(xi , Bi) < U(zi , Bi )  then f(B) =!= z 
indicates that z tf. o(i, e-i ) ,  and so z tf. o(i , (Bi, e-i,i) ) .  Thus, if U(xi , ei )  < U(zi , Bi ) ,  
we also have c(o(i, (Bi, e-i ,i) , Bi) = y. Therefore, f(Bi , §i, e-i ,j) = y. Using a similar 
argument for agent j ,  we can show that f(Bi , {Ji, e-i ,i) = y. But then, given that {Ji E 
r(zi , Bi) and {Ji E r(yi, Bi) , we get that f(Bi , {Ji, e-i ,j) = y = z, which is a contradiction.D 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
Let f be strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal. 
Step 1: Identification of the dictator. 
Let Bi E ( � ) , Vi E N. Then Pareto-optimality implies that there exists an 
agent, say agent 1, who gets K at e. That is, given the feasibility constraints, f(B) = 
(K, O ,  . . .  , 0) .  
Step 2 :  No agent can affect the dictator at a profile where each agent's first choice 
is K and second choice is 0. 
Let 01 E (0). Then 3i E N \ {1} such that Ji(01, e-1) = K, by Pareto-optimality. 
Let this agent be agent 2, so that !(01, e-1) = (0, K, 0 ,  . . .  , 0) , by feasibility. Then 
1A(B)2. Suppose 2A(B)l. Then, by Lemma 4, we have one of three cases: (a) 302 E 82 
such that f2( 02, e-2) = K, or (b) 302 E 82 such that j1 ( 02, e-2) = j1 ( B1, e-1) = 0,  or 
(c)/2(B1, e-1) = 0. Clearly, (c) doesn't hold. If (a) holds then agent 2 can manipulate 
at e via 02• If (b) holds then Pareto-optimality implies that either agent 2 gets K at 
(82, e-2) ,  which leads to the same contradiction as in case (a) , or some agent other than 
1 or 2 gets K at (02, e-2) ,  which implies that agent 2 is bossy. Therefore, •(2A(B)l) . 
Next , we show that Vi E N \ {1, 2} , •(iA(B)l) . Fix i E N \ {1, 2} . Suppose iA(B)l. 
Then 30i E ei such that j1(0i , e-i) =/= j1(B) . By nonbossiness, Ji(Oi , e-i) =/= Ji(B) = 0. 
We know that fi(Oi , e-i) =/= K, otherwise agent i can manipulate at e via Oi . Therefore, 
Ji(Oi , e-i) = p, where p E K, p =/= K, p =/= 0. Then feasibility and Pareto-optimality imply 
that ji(Oi , e-i) = 0, Vj E N\ {i}. Now let {Ji E ( � ) . Then Pareto-optimality implies 
that 3j E N such that ji(Bi , e-i) = K. If Ji({Ji , e-i) = K, then i can manipulate at 
e via {Ji. If ji(Bi , e-i) = I< for some j E N\ {1, i} then i is bossy at (Bi , e-i) versus 
e. Therefore, j1(Bi , e-i) = I< , and the feasibility constraints imply that Ji({Ji , e-i) = 0. 
However, in this case, agent i can manipulate at ({Ji , e-i) via Oi , which contradicts f's 
strategyproofness. This completes the proof that Vi E N\ {1} , •(iA(B)l. 
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Step 3: No coalition of then - 1 non-dictators can change the outcome, as long as 
the dictator's first choice is K. 
( K . . .  K ) Given Step 2, no agent other than 1 can change the outcome at e= 0 . . . 0 , 
by changing her strategy alone. Now we want to show that no coalition of the n - 1 
agents, excluding agent 1, can change the outcome at e by jointly deviating. Assume the 
contrary. Then ::ie-1 E e-1 such that f(01, e-1) # (K, 0, . . .  , 0). If n = 2, then Step 3 
holds by Step 2, so let n � 3. Let e-1 c e-1 be a subset of the set of preference profiles 
for then - 1 agents, such that ve-1 E 8-1, f(01, e-1) # (K, 0, . . .  , 0) . For all e-1 E 8-1, 
let L(e-1) = { i E N\ {1} I §i ti. ( � )} · Let l = min(tJ-l)Ee-i{I L(e-1) I}, i .e. , l is the 
minimum number of the agents contained in any coalition in N \ {1} that can jointly 
change the outcome at e by deviating their strategies. Note that l � 2, by Step 2. 
Now fix e-1 E e-1 such that L(e-1) = l. Let L = { i E N\ {1} I §i ti. ( � )} , and 
- K O  K ·  . . K . . . ( -L ) let f ( e1' e-1) = f 0 ' ' 0 .. . 0 = x ' assummg, without loss of generality, 
h w. L . < l 1 Th . . . l' h. f ( K XL K . . . K ) t at viE , i _ + . en monotomc1ty imp ies t at 0 0 . . . 0 = x, 
L 2 l+l . ( K, ei' xL\{i} K . . . K ) where x = (x , ... , x ). Given that I L I= l, f 0 0 . .  . 0 = 
(K, 0, . .. , 0) , Vi E L, where Bi E ( � ) . Since x # (K, 0, ... , 0) , x1 = 0, by Pareto­
optimality and feasibility. Now let L = N \ (L LJ{l} ) , so that N can be partitioned into 
{1}, L, and L. (Note that L = 0 if l = n - 1. ) We know that xL = (x1+2, ... , xn) = 
(0,  . . .  , 0) ,  otherwise some j E L  gets K at (e1,e-1), and thus each i E L is bossy at 
( 01, e-1) versus ( 01, Bi, §-l,i), given the feasibility constraints. We also know that ::Ji* E L 
such that xi* # 0, otherwise Pareto-optimality requires that either x1 = K or xj = K 
for some j E L, which is a contradiction. But then Vi E L \ { i* }, xi # 0, otherwise i is 
bossy at (81,8-1) versus (e1,ei,§-I.i). Therefore, Vi E L,xi # 0. Given that I L I� 2 and 
Vi E L, xi # 0, the feasibility constraints imply that xi# K, Vi E L. Therefore, I L I� k. 
Now we will show that 
K K x3 xl+l K . . . �)= f 0 x2 0 . . .  
K K K xi+l xl+l K . . . � )= (1) f 0 x2 xi 0 
f K K K K �) =x. 0 x2 xl+l 0 
First notice that no agent other than 1 can get K, as long as agent 1 and each agent 
j E L report ( � ) , since otherwise some agent i E L is bossy, given the feasibility 
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constraints. (If I L I= 2 and one agent in L gets K then the other agent in L is the bossy 
agent. ) If the outcome were (K, 0, ... , 0) for any of the above preference profiles then 
the appropriate agent i (i E L) can manipulate via (xi). Therefore, Pareto-optimality 
implies that (1) holds. 
( O K  ... K K Using monotonicity, we get that f 2 l+l 0 x ... x � 
) = x. Now take 
i* E L such that 
·* ( 0 K .. · K 0 r 0 ... 0 
0 ) = K, (2) 
where Vi E L, i 's strategy is ( � ) , and Vi <f. L, i 's strategy is (0). Note that i* 
satisfying (2) exists by Pareto-optimality. Let i* = 2, without loss of generality. If agent 
2 gets K at 
( 0 K K K 0 .. . 0 ) 
0 x3 xl+I 
then agent 2 can manipulate at 
( 0 K K 0 ... 0 ) 
x2 xl+I 0 .. : 0 
via ( � ) . If some other i E L, i =/= 2 gets K at that profile, then monotonicity implies 
that (2) is contradicted. Therefore, 
( 0 K K .. · K 0 . .  · 0 ) 3 t+i f 0 3 1+1 =(0,0,x, ... , x  , o, . . . , O) ,  x ... x 
by Pareto-optimality. Then monotonicity implies that 
( 0 0 K .. · K 0 .. · 0 ) 3 t+i f 3 t+i =(0, 0, x, ... , x  , o, ... , O) .  x ... x 
Now let L2 = L \ {2} ,  and apply the same argument to L2 as the one applied to L above. 
Letting i* = 3, where i* E L2 satisfies 
we get that 
·* ( 0 0 K . . · K 0 r 0 ... 0. 
0 ) = K, 
0 ... 0 ) = 
( 0 0 0 K .. · K 0 .. · 0 ) _ 4 t+I f x4 ... x1+1 -(0, 0, 0, x, ... , x  , 0, ... ,0). 
Continuing iteratively until we get to L1-1, we find that 




0 ... 0 ) = xl+I, 
which violates Pareto-optimality. Note that we can get this contradiction for any number 
of agent in L, as long as I L I:'.:: 2, and regardless of the size of L, which might be the 
empty set. Furthermore, since 2 ::SI L l::S k, we need at least two objects. Therefore, this 
proof applies to any number of agents such that n :'.:: 3 and any number of objects such 
that k :'.:: 2. 
Therefore, v§-1 E e-1, f1(B1, §-1) = K, where 01 E (K) . But then VB1 E 81 such 
that 01 E ( � ) , ve-1 E e-1, j1(B) = K, by monotonicity, which is what we wanted to 
show. D 
Step 4: No coalition of the n - 1 non-dictators can change the outcome for the 
dictator at any profile. 
Let 01 E ( � } where p E K, p  '/" K, p '/" 0. Suppose /1(0) '/" p for some 0-1 E e-1. 
Then j1(B) = K, otherwise Step 3 implies that agent 1 can manipulate at B via 01 E (K) . 
However, in this case J (B) = (K, 0, ... , 0), given the feasibility constraints, and thus 
the outcome (p, 0, ... , 0) Pareto-dominates (k, . . .  , 0) at B. Therefore, Pareto-optimality 
implies that j1(B) = p. Then, by monotonicity, VB1 E (p) ,  ve-1 E e-1, j1(B) = p. Finally, 
if 01 E (0) then j1 ( B) = 0, ve-1 E e-1, by Pareto-optimality. Thus, together with Step 3, 
we have VB E 8, j1(B) = top(B1 ) .  Therefore, agent 1 is a dictator, and f is dictatorial. D 
In order to get an analog of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for nonbossy mecha­
nisms, we show that a strategyproof and nonbossy SCF that satisfies citizen sovereignty 
is Pareto-optimal. 
Definition 10 An SCF f satisfies citizen sovereignty (CS) if Vx EX, 30 E 8 such that 
J(B) = x. 
Proposition 2 A strategyproof, nonbossy, and CS SCF is Pareto-optimal. 
Proof: Let f be strategyproof, nonbossy, CS, and not Pareto-optimal. Then 3x, y E X 
with f(O) = x for some 0 E 8, such that Vi E N, U(yi, Oi) :'.:: U(xi, Oi), and for some 
j E N,U(yJ,OJ) > U(xJ,OJ). Define B E  8 as follows. For each i EN such that xi -=f yi, 
let §i E ( ;: ) , and for each i E N such that xi = yi, let §i E (yi). Then f(B) = x, 
by monotonicity. Since f is CS, 30 E 8 such that J(B) = y. Now let Bi E (yi). Then 
J(B) = y, by monotonicity. However, §i E r(y, Bi), Vi E N so that x = y. This is a 
contradiction, since U(yJ, OJ) > U(xJ, OJ), for some j E N.D 
Corollary 1 A strategyproof, nonbossy, and CS SCF is dictatorial. 
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The corollary follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2. 
Not all dictatorial mechanisms are strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal since 
in our context indifferences cannot be ruled out entirely, and we defined dictatorship 
accordingly. Therefore, if the dictator is indifferent among outcomes that give her top 
allocation to her, which implies that some objects are available for allocation among the 
rest of the agents (at least one) , then there is still room for manipulation and bossi­
ness, and it is possible to get a Pareto-dominated outcome. In the next proposition, we 
characterize the set of strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal SCF's. 
Let L,(N) denote the set of permutations of N. Then er E Li(N) is an ordered list 
of the agents, i .e . ,  er = (er1, ... , ern). For the following definition, let the null object be 
defined as the empty set, i .e. , let 0 = 0. Let er : 8 H- Li(N) be a function that assigns 
an ordered list of the agents to each profile. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote 
er(B) by ere so that ere = (erJ, ... , er0), 'if(} E 8. Then, if er� = j, we write that ere(j) = i .  
For the following definition, let the null object be  defined as the empty set, i .e., let 
0 = 0. 
Definition 1 1  An SCF f is a sequential choice function if 3er : 8 H Li(N) such that 
\:;/(} E 8, jCTJ(O) = cCTJ(JC, (}CTJ) = top (OCTJ), and, for j E N\ {1} , f�(B) are defined recur­
sively by f�(B) = c�(JC \ ut:i{JCT�(B)} , (}�) .  We then call CJe ans-hierarchy associated 
with f at e. 
Definition 1 2  An SCF f is a dictatorial sequential choice function if it is a sequential 
choice function such that 'if(}' e E e' crJ = erJ' and, 'if j E N \ {1}' if JCT� ( B) = JCT� ( B) for 
i = 1, ... , j - 1, then � = er�. 
· Proposition 3 An SCF is strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal if, and only if, 
it is a dictatorial sequential choice function. 
Proof: 
(a) First we prove that a dictatorial sequential choice function is strategyproof, non­
bossy, and Pareto-optimal. It is easy to verify that a sequential choice function is Pareto­
optimal, hence we will only show i) strategyproofness and ii) nonbossiness. 
i) Let f be a dictatorial sequential choice function. First we show that an agent cannot 
change her rank in the appropriate orderings by deviating alone. Fix (} E 8, j E N, and 
'(;j E 8j. Let ue(j) = t and u(eJ,e-J)(j) = l, where t ,  l E N. Suppose t =/:- l. If t = 1 then 
l = 1, so t =f. l implies that t =f. 1. By symmetry, l =/:- 1. Suppose t = 2. Then, since 
t =f. l, and l =f.1, jCTJ(e) = fCT�eJ ,e-i )(ej, e-j) = top(OCTJ) , which implies that t =f. 2, and 
by symmetry, l =/:- 2. Continuing iteratively, we get that t tj. N, which is a contradiction. 
Therefore, 'if(} E 8, 'i/j E N, 'i/Bj E 8j, ue(j) = er(eJ,e-J)(j). 
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Now keep B E 8, j E N, and Bi E 8i fixed and let CJe(j) = (J(Bi,e-i)(j) = t ,  where 1 t E N. Clearly, j cannot manipulate if t = 1 .  If t = 2 then BuJ = Bu<6i .o-i> implies 
that juJ(B) = futM.9-i>(Bi , B-i) = top(BuJ) . Then Ji (B) = d(K \ {top(BuJ} , Bi) and 
Ji(Bi , B-i) = d(K, \ {top(BuJ} , Bi) ,  so that j cannot manipulate. Similarly, if t > 2, then 
BuJ = Butui,o-i) implies that 1uJ(B) = 1utui.o-i>(Bi , B-i) = top(BuJ) , which in turn implies 
that CJ�= CJ�ei,e-i)' Then Bu
�= Bu�ui,e-i>, which implies that fu�(B) = fu�ui,o-i>(Bi , B-i) ,  
etc, till we get to t-1. In sum, fu�(B) = fu;ui,o-i>(Bi , B-i) ,  for i = 1, ... , t-l, and so 
K\LJ!:i {Ju�(B) } = K\LJ!:i {fu;Bi,9-i>(Bi , B-i)}. Therefore, agent j cannot manipulate for 
any t E N. Since B, j ,  and Bi were chosen arbitrarily, this proves that f is strategyproof. 
ii) Fix B E 8, j E N, and Bi E 8i. Then CJe(j) = (J(Bi,e-i) (j) and fu�(B) = 
ai - . . . . - . . f <6i,o-i>(BJ, B-J) for i = 1, . . .  , t-1, where CJe(j) = t ,  by i). Suppose jJ(B) = fJ(BJ, B-J). 
Then CJ�+l = CJ�h�e-i)' and K \ LJ!=1{fu�(B)} = iC\ LJ!=1{f
u;6i,9-iJ(Bi , B-i )} ,  which implies 
that fu�+1(B) = fu�t/o-iJ(Bi , B-i). This, in turn, implies that CJ�+2 = CJ�h�e-i)' Continuing 
iteratively, we get that Ju� ( B) = fu�6i ,o-i) (Bi ' B-i) for l = t + 1, ... ' n, which proves that f is nonbossy. 
(b) Conversely, we prove that a strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal SCF is a 
dictatorial sequential choice function. Suppose f is strategyproof, nonbossy, and Pareto­
optimal. By Proposition 1, f is dictatorial. Let agent 1 be the dictator. Fix B1 E 81, 
and let K,2 = K, \ {top(B1) }. Now let h be an SCF which is defined for the set of agents 
N2 = N\ { 1 }  and the set K2 such that VB-1 E 8-1, Vi E N2, f�(B-1) = Ji(B1, B-1 ). Since f 
is Pareto-optimal, and j1(B1, B-1) = top(B1 ) ,  VB-1 E 8-1, f2 is also Pareto-optimal. Since 
f is strategyproof and nonbossy, no agent i E N2 can manipulate or be bossy at (B1, B-1) 
for any B-1 E 8-1. Therefore, f2 is strategyproof and nonbossy. Thus, by Proposition 
1, f2 is dictatorial. (If K,2 is a singleton, we can use Proposition 4 in Papai (1996). )  Let 
agent 2 be the dictator for f2. Note that the identity of the dictator for h may only 
depend on B1. Now fix B2 E 82 , etc. Repeating the same argument for n = 2, ... , n - 1, 
this proves that f is a sequential choice function such that VB , B E 8, CJJ = CJ�, and, for 
j = 2, . .. , n - l, CJi (B) depends only on Bu�, i = l, ... , j- l, VB E 8, where Cle is an 
s-hierarchy associated with f at B' 
Now fix CJe E Li(N) , VB E 8, such that CJe is an s-hierarchy associated with fat B. Let 
CJJ = 1, VB E 8, and fix B1 E 81. Let B1 E 81 be such that , j1(B) = j1(01, B-1) , where 
B1 =/= 01. (For example, let B1 E r(f (B) , B1 ).) Note that B-1 E e-1 is arbitrary. Now let 
CJ� = i and CJ�01 ,e-i) = j. Suppose i =/= j. Since f is a sequential choice function, Ji ( B) = 
ci (K \ {top(B1) } , Bi) and ji (01, B-1) = ci (K, \ {top(01)} , Bi). However, top(B1) = top(01). 
Therefore, Ji ( B1, B-1) = d (IC \ {top( B1 ) } ,  Bi ). Now suppose, without loss of generality, 
that Bi and Bi satisfy ci(K,\ { top(B1 ) } ,  Bi) = d (IC\ {top( B1} ) ,  Bi). Then Ji (B) = Ji (01, B-1) 
is not feasible, which violates f's nonbossiness. Therefore, i = j ,  and thus 'VB1, 01 E 81 
such that j1(B) = f1(01, B-1) implies that CJ� = CJ�, if j1(B) = j1(0) , since (J� depends 
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only on 01 and (]"� depends only on 01 . Repeating the same argument for j = 3, . . . , n, 
we get that f is a dictatorial sequential choice function. D  
Note that if bossiness is allowed, then a strategyproof and Pareto-optimal SCF need 
not be dictatorial, as long as there are at least three agents. Thus, in general, when 
designing Pareto-optimal and strategyproof mechanisms for allocating heterogeneous ob­
jects, one may chose between dictatorial and bossy mechanisms. If there are only two 
agents, however, then Lemma 2 implies, together with Proposition 1, that any strate­
gyproof and Pareto-optimal SCF is dictatorial. We give an example of a nondictatorial, 
strategyproof, and Pareto-optimal SCF below. 
Example 1 7 A nondictatorial, strategyproof, and Pareto-optimal SCF where n = 3 .  
Let f be a sequential choice function. Define e = {BE e I if()()= (1, 2 ,  3) , j3(B) = 0 and if 
(jB = (2, 1, 3), j3(B) = O} ,  where (jB is an s-hierarchy associated with f at e. Now fix 
p E JC, p =/= K, p =/= 0. Let (jB = (1, 2, 3) ,  VB rt 8 and VB E 8 if 03 E (p) . Otherwise, let 
(jB = (2, 1, 3) . Clearly, f is Pareto-optimal, since it is a sequential choice function. It is 
nondictatorial, since, for example, 
and 
f ( K \{p} K \{p} P ) = (p, K\ {p} , O), 
f ( K \ {p} K \ {p} 
K \ {p} ) = ( K \ {p} 'P' 0). 
To see that f is strategyproof, note that agents 1 and 2 cannot affect the ordering at 
any profile, and that agent 3 can only affect the ordering when she is indifferent. This 
example works with any number of objects such that k � 2, and can easily be generalized 
to more than three agents. D 
The above defined SCF is bossy. In particular, agent 3 is bossy at some profiles where 
she does not get any object, for example, at the above displayed two profiles. 
4 Characterization of Strategyproof, Strongly Non­
bossy, and Pareto-optimal Social Choice Functions 
A sequntial choice.mechanism with a single hierarchy, which we call a serial dictatorship, 
is a mechanism in which the agents get their favorite allocation from a feasible set (the 
remaining objects) , according to a predetermined order. That is, the outcomes of a serial 
dictatorship correspond to a decentralized mechanism in which the agent who is ranked 
7 A similar example is provided in Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981, Endnote 2), in the context 
of divisible goods. This is a very natural example of a nondictatorial and bossy mechanism, where an 
agent, who is a "loser" at certain profiles, gets to alternate the dictators at those profiles. 
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first chooses her favorite allocation from the fixed set of objects K, then the second agent 
chooses her favorite allocation from the remaining objects, etc, until all the objects are 
taken, or until we get to the last agent, whichever happens first . ··Note that since the 
first agent gets to "choose" from the set of all the objects, and all the subsequent agents 
"choose" from all the objects available after the higher ranked agents made their choices, 
these SCF's are Pareto-optimal. This contrasts with the observation of Satterthwaite 
and Sonnenschein (1981) that serial dictatorships violate Pareto-optimality, which they 
demonstrate with an example of a production economy. Since we do not consider pro­
duction, a serial dictatorship is Pareto-optimal in our framework. It is also easy to verify 
that a serial dictatorship is strategyproof and nonbossy. 
Similarly to Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981), we examine which additional 
requirements, if imposed on an SCF, would imply that it is a serial dictatorship. It turns 
out that a mild strengthening of nonbossiness, which we call strong nonbossiness, is 
enough to constrain the choice of SCF's to serial dictatorships, when required in addition 
to strategyproofness and Pareto-optimality. Strong nonbossiness means that if an agent 
deviates at some profile, with the result that the extra objects that she obtains (if any) are 
unassigned at the given profile, and the objects that she loses (if any) remain unassigned 
at the new profile, then the other agents' allocations remain unchanged. In other words, 
strong nonbossiness requires that if an agent's action does not affect the others through 
the feasibility constraints then it should not affect the other agents at all. Clearly, strong 
nonbossiness implies nonbossiness, but bossiness does not imply strong nonbossiness, even 
if strategyproofness is also required. It can also be shown (analogously to Lemma 2) that 
a Pareto-optimal SCF is strongly nonbossy if there are only two agents. 
Definition 13 An SCF f is strongly nonbossy if Vi E N, \:/8 E 8, and \:/Bi E 8isuch that 
Ji(e)nfi(Bi,8-i) = 0 and Ji(Oi,8-i)nfi(8) = 0, Vj E N, j =/. i, we have Ji(8) = 
Ji(ei, 8-i), Vj E N, j =1- i .  
For the following definition, let the null object be defined as the empty set, i.e. ,  let 
0 = 0. 
Definition 14 An SCF j is a serial dictatorship if ::la E 2:i(N) such that 't/8 E 8, j°·1 (8) = 
cu1 (JC, 8u1) = top( 8u1), and for j E N \ {1}, Jui ( 8) are defined recursively by Jui ( 8) = 
cui (JC \ LJi;::f {Jui ( 8)}, 8ui). We then call a the d-hierarchy associated with f. 
Now we are ready to prove the characterization theorem. 
Proposition 4 An SCF f is strategyproof, strongly nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal if, 
and only if, it is a serial dictatorship. 
Proof: It is easy to check that a serial dictatorship is strategyproof, strongly nonbossy, 
and Pareto-optimal. In order to prove that a strategyproof, strongly nonbossy, and 
Pareto-optimal SCF is a serial dictatorship, we need to introduce some definitions. The 
proof will proceed by several lemmas. 
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Definition 15 An SCF J is multihierarchical if :30" : 8 1--t "Ei(N) such that Vi, j  E N, if 
O"e(i) < O"e(j) then U(Ji(B), Bi) > U(Ji(B), Bi), unless Ji(B) = Ji(B) = 0. We then call O"e 
an m-hierarchy associated with J at B. 
Therefore, if J is multihierarchical then there exists a "hierarchy" of the agents for 
each profile, not necessarily the same for each profile, such that each agent prefers her 
allocation at that profile to the allocation of all the agents at the same profile who rank 
lower than she in the hierarchy for that profile. Thus, loosely speaking, if there is a 
"conflict" among agents at some profile then it is resolved according to the hierarchy at 
that profile. 
Definition 16 The top set T(j, B) for each agent j and profile (} contains the sets of 
objects that j prefers to her allocation at that profile, given some SCF J. That is, 
T(j, B) = {P E K 1 u(p, Bi) > u(Ji (B), Bi)}, VJ E N, VB E e. 
· 
Clearly, VB E 8, Vj E N, 0 </. T(j, B), since the objects need not be assigned. 
Definition 17 Given an SCF J, agent i beats agent j at(}, if Ji(()) E T(j, B). This 
relationship is denoted by B(B). That is, if i beats j at(}, then we write iB(B)j. 
Lemma 5 A Pareto-optimal SCF is multihierarchical. 
Proof: Let J be a Pareto-optimal SCF. Then VB E 8, B(B) is acyclic for f. That is, 
VB E 8, if i1B(B)i2B(B) · · · B(B)it for i1 E N, l = 1, . . . , t, 2 :::; t :::; n, then •(itB(B)i1).8 
This implies that VB E 8, :30" E "Ei(N) such that Vi, j E N if iB(B)j then D"e(j) > D"e(i). 
Then Vi, j  E N, VB E 8, D"e(j) > D"e(i) implies that •(jB(B)i), which in turn implies that 
U(Ji(B), (Ji) 2: U(Ji(B), (Ji). But Ji(B) =/= Ji(B), unless Ji(B) = Ji(B) = 0, since f(B) is not 
feasible otherwise. Thus, U(Ji(B), Bi) > U(Ji(B), (Ji), Vi, j E N, VB E 8 if O"e(j) > O"e(i), 
unless Ji(B) = fj(B) = 0 . Therefore, VB E e, O"e is an m-hierarchy associated with f at 
(}, and thus f is multihierarchical.D 
Let (Ji E ( � ) denote some preferences of agent i such that a is ranked first, y is 
ranked second ,  and the rest of the preferences is arbitrary. We use a similar notation for 
profiles. For example, (} E ( � � ) if ()1 E ( � ) and ()2 E ( � ) . Furthermore, we 
write J ( � � ) = x to indicate that f assigns outcome x to all profiles in ( � � ) . 
Lemma 6 For every strategyproof, strongly nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal SCF there 
exists a single m-hierarchy that is associated with it at every profile. 
8The logic symbol -, means 'not' in this study. 
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Proof: Let f be strategyproof, strongly nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal. For Steps 1-3, 
fix i , j E N and e, e E 8 such that ji(B) = K, iB(B)j, and jB(B)i. By Pareto-optimality, 
Vi E N, 30 E 8 such that Ji(B) = K. If there do not exist j and 0 such that iB(B)j , and 
jB(B)i, where Ji(B) = K then the lemma holds. Let f(B) = x and f(B) = y. 
Step 1: If iB(B)j such that Ji(B) = K and jB(B)i for some j E N and e E 8 then 
Ji(B) =!= K. 
Suppose Ji(O) = K. Let Oi, iji  E ( � ) . Let 01 E (O) , VZ E N \ {i, j}. Given that 
iB(B)j , f 's monotonicity implies that J(O) = x. However, since jB(B)i, monotonicity 
also implies that /(0) = x. Since x = y contradicts feasibility, /i(B) =I= K. 
Step 2: If jB(B)i for some i , j E N} E 8 then 30 E 8 with 01 E (0), Vl E N \ {i, j} 
such that jB(O)i. 
Suppose that \Iii E 8 such that ii' E (0), \ll E N \ { i, j} , •(j B( il)i) . Led ' E ( � ) 
and 01 E ( �1 ) , Vl E N \ {i}. Then j(B) = y by �onotonicity, given that jB(B)i and 
yi E T(i, e-i). If 01 E (0), Vl E N \ { i, j} then Pareto-optimality and feasibility imply 
that Ji(eiJ/, o-i,j) = yi , given that -, (jB(ei, ei , o-i,j)i) . However, since f is strongly 
nonbossy, Pareto-optimality implies that Ji(Bi, Bj , BL , OL) = yi, VL � N \ {i , j } ,  where 
- . =i =j - . . . 
L = N\ ( { i , j} LJ L). For L = N\ {i, j} we get that ti(B , e , e-i,1 ) = yi. This implies that 
yi = yi , so that yi = yi = 0, given the feasibility constraints. However, yi E T( i , e-i) 
implies that yi '/= 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, if jB(B)i for some i , j  E N, and 
B E  8 then 30 E 8 with 01 E (0), Vl E N \ {i, j} such that jB(O)i. 
Step _3: If jB(O)i such that /i(O) '/= K and 01 E (0), Vl E N \ {i, j } then 30 E 8 such 
that jB(O)i and /i(O) = K. 
Let J(O) = z and let i = 1, j = 2. By assumption, z2 '/= K, and since 2B(O)l , z2 '/= 0. 
By Pareto-optimality, z1 = 0, Vl E N\ {l , 2}. By monotonicity, f ( ;� � O · · · O ) = 
( 1 2 0 0) N . d fil . ( z2 z2 0 . . . 0 ) . If 1 _;_ z = z , z , , ... , . ow cons1 er some pro e m 0 0 . · z 1 
0 then Pareto-optimality implies that either agent 1 or agent 2 gets z2 at this pro­
file. If agent 1 gets z2 then she can manipulate at ( ;� � O · · · O ) via ( � ) . 
( z2 z2 0 · · · 0 ) Therefore, Pareto-optimality yields f 0 0 = (0, z2, 0, . . . , 0) . Then 
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( z2 z2 O . . .  O ) 
f K 0 
0 
ag:� z: ,t: ���::u�:::ea:h( :te� P:et���P�)ru v�:t(r) <�' �o��· ��:;a:::� :n:::� ( z2 K O · · · 0 ) 
file in � � . There are two Pareto-optimal outcomes at these pro-
files, (z2 , 0, . . .  , 0) and (0, K, 0, . . .  , 0), given the feasibility constraints. If the outcome 





= K. Letting one :f these profiles be ii, we get that Ji(il) = 
j2 (1J) = K ,  and K E  T(i, 1J) implies that jB(O)i ,  as desired. 
Step 4: If iB(O)j for some i ,  j E N and 0 E 8 such that Ji(O) = K then VB E 
e ,  •(jB(B)i). 
This step follows from Steps 1-3. Suppose iB(O)j for some i , j E N  and 0 E 8 such 
that Ji (O) = K and jB(B)i for some B E  e. Since jB(B)i, :31J with 01 E (0), 'r/l E N \  { i, j}  
such that jB(iJ)i ,  by Step 2 .  Then :30 E e such that Ji (O) = K and jB(O)i, by Step 
3. However, this contradicts the assumption that iB(B)j where Ji (O) = K, by Step 1. 
Therefore, 'r/i, j  E N if iB(O)j for some B E O such that f(B) = K then 'r/B E 8, --,(jB(B)i). 
Step 5: There exists a E '2:i(N) such that a is an m-hierarchy associated with f at 
each profile. 
( K . .. K ) . Let B[1J E O . . . O . Then ::Ji E N  such that r (B[iJ ) = K, by Pareto-optimality, 
and then Ji (B[iJ ) = O, 'r/j E N \ {i} ,  given the feasibility constraints. Let i = 1. Now 
( 0 K . . . K ) ., let B[2J E O . . . O . Then ::Ji' E N \ {1}  such that r (B[2J )  = K,  by Pareto-
optimality, and so Ji (B[2J )  = 0, 'r/j E N \ {i' } ,  given the feasibility constraints. Let 
i' = 2. Continuing in the same manner, we get an ordering of the agents, a= (1,  . . .  , n) . 
Now fix i ,  j E N. If i < j then iB(B[iJ )j and Ji(O(iJ )  = K. Then Step 4 implies that 'r/B E 8, •(jB(O)i). Thus, VO E 8, U(Ji (O) , Oi ) > U(ji (O) ,fJi ) ,  unless Ji (O) = ji (B) = 0 . 
Therefore, a= (1, ... , n) is an m-hierarchy associated with f at each profile 0.D 
Let o (i ,  e-i) = {x E x  I =iei E eisuch thatf(B) = x} denote agent i 's option set (for 
f) at profile e. Let oi (i, e-i) = {p E K  I ::JOi E eisuch thatfi(O) = p} .  That is, oi (i , e-i) 
is the set of allocations that agent i can get by deviating her messages when the other 
agents' report is e-i. Clearly, 0 Eoi (i , O-i) , Vi E N, 'r/0 E 8. 
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Lemma 7 If an SCF is strategyproof, strongly nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal such that 
there exists a single m-hierarchy, CJ, associated with it at each profile then it is a serial 
dictatorship with d-hierarchy CJ .  
Proof: Let f be strategyproof, strongly nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal such that CJ = 
(1, . . .  , n) is an m-hierarchy associated with it at each profile 8. 
Step 1: If p E T(i , 8) then 3j E N, j < i , such that pn /i(8) -1- 0. 
Fix i E N, fJ E 8 ,  and p E IC, p #- 0. Suppose that p E T(i, 8) for some i E N and 
Vj E N \ {i} , j < i, pnfi(8) = 0. Then Pareto-optimality implies that 3j E N \ {i} 
such that pnfi(8) -1- 0. Suppose there are t � 1 such agents, ji , . . .  , jt ,  i .e. , for 
l = 1, . . . , t , pnfi1 -1- 0 such that j1 > i . Let f(8) = x. Let Bi E ( x; ) , Vj E N \ {i} 
and let ii' E ( � ) . Then monotonicity implies that J(O) = x. By strong nonbossiness 
and Pareto-optimality, f(Bi, §J, 0, . . .  , 0) = (xi, xJ, 0, . . .  , 0), where J = {ji , . . .  , jt} ,  xJ = 










o:::.:n::a:h:y s:::e:�u:i:eb:a:�: (�s�� (: : :tr:J�) in 
( x' , x;' , . . .  , xi•). Now consider a profile in ( �' x�' : : : x�' } Since •(j 1 B ( B )i ) ,  VO E 
::�t ::::te::e:: :: �:rn :r::::� ::::nt::: :: :�p:a:::: · t r��o-::�i�t)' 
via ( �' ) . Therefore, agent i gets x;' , and thus Pareto-optimality implies that 
f ( �' x�' : : : x�' ) = (xi' , O, xh , . . .  , x;' ) .  By monotonicity, (or Pareto-optimality 
and nonbossiness) , we get f ( �' O x�' : : : x�' ) = ( x;' , 0, xh , . . .  , x;' ) .  Now we 
can continue by replacing iteratively i 's strategy with ( �' ) , ( �' ) , etc. When 
we get to ( p ) ( p 0 . . . xi
�





�' ) = (x;'-' ,  0, . . .  , 0, xi•). Then 
( p O . • •  O xit ) 
f x�t 0 = (p, 0, . . .  , 0) , since •(JtB(O)i) , VO E 8, and so Jt cannot get 
xit . Then(, ag;nt i 0ge:s. �' �y ��re)to-opt1(· m�ity). However, in this case, agent i can manip­
ulate at xi�-1 0 via x�t , which contradicts f 's strategyproofness. 
Therefore, Vi E N, \Ip E K, p =/= 0, VO E 8 if p E T( i, 0) then 3j E n ,  j < i such that 
p n fi (e) =1= 0 . 
Step 2: f is a serial dictatorship where er is the cl-hierarchy associated with f .  
For this step, set 0 = 0. Fix i E N and p E K .  Let ei be  such that top(Oi) = p ,  and 
suppose that e-i E e-i is such that Vj E N \ {i} , j  < i , p n fi(O) = 0. Then p � T(i, O) , 
by Step 1, and so Ji (O) = p. This proves that 
Vi E N, \Ip E K, VO E 8, if p n fi(O) = 0, Vj E N \ {i} , j  < i, then p E oi (i, e-i). (3) 
Since Vj E N\ { 1} , j  > 1, we have p E o1 (1 ,  e-1), \Ip E K, ve-1 E e-1 , which implies that 
o1(1 , e-1) = K. Now fix i E J! \ { �} .  Suppose � ()_f1 (�) =/= 0 and p E oi (i� e-i) , for some e E 8 and p E K.  Then 3ei E ei such that j1(0t ,  e-i) = p. Then j1 (Bt , e-i) =/= j1 (0) , 
given the feasibility constraints. Clearly, if f is strategyproof and nonbossy, then the 
outcome at every profile is the best option at that profile for each agent. That is, 
VO E e, Vi E N, Ji( 0) = ci ( o( i, e-i), Oi) .  Since o1 (1, ( e\ e-i,I)) = K, this implies that 
f1(Bi , e-i) = j1(e) = c1 (K, 01) ,  which is a contradiction. Then Vi E N, Vp E K, Ve E e, 
if p n f1 (0) =!= 0,p � 02(2, e-2). This implies, together with (3) , that oi (i , e-i) = K \ 
{f1 (0)} ,  VO E e. Now fix i E N\ {1 , 2} . Suppose p n j2 (0) =/= 0 and p E oi (i, e-i), for some 
e E 8, p E K. Then a similar argument to the one applied to agent 1 above shows that this 
is a contradiction, and we can imply that o3 (3, e-3) = K \ { (j1 (0) } LJ{f2 (0)} ,  using (3) . 
Continuing iteratively, we get that VO E 8, Vi E N \ { 1 } ,  oi (i, e-i) = K \ LJ::i {f1(0) } ,  
where o1 ( 1 ,  e-1) = K.  Thus, we have j1 (0) = c1(K, 0 1 )  and for i E N \ { 1  } ,  ji (e) = 
ci (K \ LJ::i {jl (O)} ,  e-i), VO E e. Therefore, f is a serial dictatorship such that the 
cl-hierarchy associated with f is (1, . . .  , n) .D  
Proposition 4 follows immediately from the three lemmas. 
It should be remarked that Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein's result (1981, Theorem 
2) does not imply ours. Although they do not require Pareto-optimality, they impose 
a number of differentiabilty assumptions on the social choice function (which they call 
regularity) and assume that each agents' consumption set is convex. These assumptions 
do not apply to economies with indivisibilities . 
It is interesting, however, to compare their sufficiency condition for serial dictatorships 
to ours. Their requirement is that the affect relation is everywhere total (in the following, 
ET) ,  i .e . ,  at each profile for any two agents at least one of them affects the other. Our 
result, therefore, looks surprising, since the strong nonbossiness condition rules out some 
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affect relations under certain circumstances. Furthermore, a serial dictatorship in our 
context does not satisfy ET. To see this, take three agents, say agents 1, 2 ,  and 3, such 
that f 1 ( B) = p at some profile B, where p E /(, p =f. 0, and 82 , 83 E ( b ) . Since agent 1 
beats both agents 2 and 3 at e, the cl-hierarchy u associated with the serial dictatorship 
f is such that u(l) < u(2) and u(l) < u(3). Now assume that u(2) < u(3) , so that 
f3(B) = 0, by Pareto-optimality. Then agent 1 cannot affect agent 3 at this profile, 
since for each {jl E 81 , if j1 ( 0\ e-1) n p =f. f/J then, given the feasibility constraints, 
Pareto-optimality requires that f3 ( B1 , e-1 ) = 0. In addition, if J1 ( B1 , e-1) n p = 0 then 
j3(1J1 ,  e-1) = 0 again, since u(2) < u(3) , and 82 E ( b ) . Notice, however, that it is 
Pareto-optimality that seems to be in conflict with ET. Indeed, if an SCF satisfies ET in 
our context , then it cannot be Pareto-optimal. (To check this, take a profile in which two 
agents' first choice is the null object.) Thus, the ET condition is too restrictive in our 
context. Pareto-optimality, however, is too restrictive in the Satterthwaite-Sonnenschein 
model, as they remark that for some standard convex and compact allocation possibility 
sets, the set of Pareto-optimal SCF's is empty. Although the two conditions are not 
necessarily compatible, they are essentially similar in their effects. To see this, note that 
Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein don't require any form of citizen sovereignty, that is, 
variation in the outcomes. Therefore, their Theorem 1 is consistent with an imposed 
mechanism,9 which says that for a strategyproof, nonbossy, and regular mechanism, the 
affect relationship is acyclic at any profile, if the domain is some open set of utility 
functions. That is, an imposed mechanism which yields the same outcome at any profile, 
a mechanism for which no agent affects any other agent at any profile, would satisfy 
the theorem. Therefore, in order to get a serial dictatorship, they need to require some 
variation in the outcomes, and ET implies just that. In light of Proposition 2 ,  our 
Pareto-optimality requirement has essentially a similar effect. 
This still does not explain the sufficiency of strong nonbossiness. Remark that in 
our model, since the objects need not be allocated, and the value of any set of objects 
may be negative to an agent, Pareto-optimality requires that at some profiles not all the 
objects are allocated. Apparently, serial dictatorship can be avoided using this type of 
lack of "conflict," so that when some variation in the outcomes are ruled out in these 
"no conflict" situations, and that's what strong nonbossiness amounts to, the ordering 
of the agents induced by Pareto-optimality must be the same for all profiles, causing the 
mechanism to be a serial dictatorship. 
5 Discussion 
We presented two main results in this paper. Firstly, we proved that all strategyproof, 
nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal SCF's are dictatorial sequential choice functions. Secondly, 
we showed that all strategyproof, strongly nonbossy, and Pareto-optimal SCF's are serial 
9This is pointed out in Muller and Satterthwaite (1986). 
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dictatorships. It is interesting to note that the concepts of strong nonbossiness and non­
bossiness are identical on domains of high conflict (e.g. , when the objects are desirable) 
if Pareto-optimality is also required, or when the contention for the object(s) is high due 
to the feasibility constraints (e.g. ,  when a single object is being allocated) . Thus, using 
a serial dictatorship may be necessary if the potential conflict of interests is severe. We 
remark that the two results are the same if there is only a single object, given that serial 
dictatorships and dictatorial sequential choice functions are also identical in this case. 10 
The results in this paper were established for strict preferences over allocations. We 
conjecture that they would also hold if weak preferences were admissable. Since an agent's 
choice from a given choice set may not be uniquely defined when weak preferences are 
allowed, this may lead to difficulties in defining Pareto-optimal SCF's . 1 1  
10See Papai (1996) 
1 1For an illustration of this problem see, for example, Svensson (1994). 
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